A Fair Trial in a Fair Tribunal : A Preface to the Petitioners\u27 Brief in \u3cem\u3eCapterton v. Massey\u3c/em\u3e by Olson, Theodore B. & Tayrani, Amir C.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 48 
Number 4 Judicial Independence Article 4 
2010 
"A Fair Trial in a Fair Tribunal": A Preface to the Petitioners' Brief in 
Capterton v. Massey 
Theodore B. Olson 
Amir C. Tayrani 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Theodore B. Olson & Amir C. Tayrani, "A Fair Trial in a Fair Tribunal": A Preface to the Petitioners' Brief in 
Capterton v. Massey, 48 Duq. L. Rev. 735 (2010). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol48/iss4/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
"A Fair Trial in a Fair Tribunal": A Preface to the
Petitioners' Brief in Caperton v. Massey
Theodore B. Olson* and Amir C. Tayranit
As Justice Kennedy stated at the outset of his opinion in Caper-
ton v. Massey, "a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement
of due process."' The Court's decision in Caperton reaffirmed that
basic constitutional guarantee. While the facts of the Caperton
case are, in the Court's words, "extraordinary," the constitutional
principles on which the decision rests are elementary; they are
fundamental to our system of justice and essential to maintaining
public confidence in our judicial system.
Every litigant has a right to have his case heard by a judge who
will hold "the balance nice, clear, and true"2 between the parties-
even where one of the litigants has the financial resources to faci-
litate the election of the judge who will decide the parties' dispute.
Where that is the case, state canons of judicial ethics and judges'
introspective appraisals of their own ability to decide a dispute in
a neutral, evenhanded fashion are insufficient to ensure that all
litigants receive what is promised to them by the Due Process
Clause and by the words engraved in the fagade of the Supreme
Court: "Equal Justice Under Law."
In another respect, however, Caperton may well prove to be ex-
traordinary. With the reaffirmation of the basic constitutional
principle that parties cannot be permitted to select the judges in
their own case, litigants may no longer have an incentive to spend
massive sums of money in an effort to elect the judges who will
decide their disputes. If that proves to be true-if Caperton turns
out to be a rarely invoked and infrequently implicated precedent-
then the decision will truly have been a victory for the principles
of judicial independence and procedural fairness on which it so
firmly rests.
* Theodore B. Olson is a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. He has argued
58 cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, including Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co.
t Amir C. Tayrani is an associate at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, and briefed the
Caperton case at the certiorari and merits stages.
1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266 (2009).
2. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2260.
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